Brazil is progressing sure to become one of the five largest economies in the next decade. There are solid foundations that distinguish it as an important global player into a future multirole international order. Therefore, commitments to broad-spectrum arena, in synch with new and complex threats, are challenging the upcoming capacities of our country.

With the approval of the National Defense Strategy, we have worked hard to produce a new consistent planning. Updated the situation analysis, we must reset the path and focus in the main effort. In that context, it was conceived the Brazilian Army’s Force Project (PROFORÇA, in Portuguese - PROFORCE) that identifies the priority goals to the Army, with mark steps in 2015, 2022 and 2031.

Our Army, based on the values and traditions that men and women of the Olive Green Institution have honored, honor and shall honor, gets ready to fulfill its future missions, driven by a tenacious determination to become a modern Ground Force, with the capabilities that the Country’s defense and commitments will request - A NEW FORCE.

The increasing cooperation in the international arena, the progressive integration of Brazil’s Armed Services and increasing interagency operations will present demands for coordination, complementarities and interoperability, yet quite new demands to the Brazilian Army, yet welcome, because we recognize that no institution is as strong as all its members united.

A large number of civilian experts and more than a hundred military, active-duty and retired, contributed to shape this project. This gives us the assurance that with contribution of many, we achieved a better result.

Together we identified that the permanent values in the Army give us the courage to renew the learning, to transform the structures and to evolve the doctrine. It is a huge challenge, but much bigger challenges our ancestors faced and prevailed upon.

The necessary drive to carry on a project of this magnitude is already in the DNA of – our call – as Soldiers. In addition to it, we have the trust of Brazilian’s Society upon the Army and the belief that we ought to be prepared to defend ourselves from intimidation, threats and even aggression, whatever they are, in order to Brazil reach the place it deserves into the concert of nations.

Onwards! Cohesion of our people will continue to be the strength of our Army.

General Enzo Martins Peri
Brazilian Army Commander

1 1 The olive-green color is a reference to the main color of Army’s traditional uniform, so it is commonly used as a synonym of the Army itself.
1. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCEPT

The prospective analysis and trends point that, by 2030, Brazil will be located amongst the five largest economies in the world and will sustain a greater political status into the International System. The most likely scenario suggests that the Brazilian Army will have to reach a strategic setting, compatible with the increasing stature of the Country. To achieve this, the Army should move, on a faster speed, from the present stage to a higher one, by a transformation process. New capabilities must be acquired and strategies are to be adopted, to provide the necessary strategic leap and consolidated into a Force Design Project, which will establish military requirements (the capabilities) and indicate Force arrangements (structure, coordination, equipment, logistics and training), coupled with budget constraints.

The Brazilian Army’s Force Project (PROFORÇA) linked to the current methodology of planning, programming and budgeting, provides guidelines for the design and evolution of the Army until 2031, with time frames in 2015 and 2022. It is new, dynamic and interactive, passes through the whole Army and is adaptable to face uncertainties that future conflicts will require. It shall guide the transformation process with guidelines for the nine Transformation Vectors (TV): Science & Technology, Doctrine, Education & Culture, Engineering, Management, Human Resources, Logistics, Budget & Finance and Training & Deployment. In line with the Strong Arm Strategy (SAS/2009), the PROFORÇA prioritizes the Army main projects, such as the Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON, in Portuguese).

During the preparation of PROFORÇA were consulted civilian and military experts – national and abroad - organized thematic meetings, leveraged the strategic diagnosis and scenarios for the Brazilian Army in 2030 and also investigated extensive bibliography which includes articles from scientific journals and military academic papers of several armies. Added to this, it was visited strategic planning departments from different countries and interviewed, with specific guidelines, more than eighty (80) generals of the Brazilian Army.

The outcomes from PROFORÇA are:

a. New deployment and structure of the Land Forces;
b. Guidelines for the strategic design of the Brazilian Army;
c. Guidelines for each TV;
d. Guidelines for shaping the future Army Basic Organization (ABO);
e. New capabilities, broken down for each legal mission of the Army, and
f. Guidelines for the integration to the Army Strategic Planning System (SIPLEx, in Portuguese).

To achieve PROFORÇA goals, the following critical factors should be considered: commitment of senior management of the institution at all levels; credibility inside Army’s workforce, cohesion and motivation of men and women serving the Force; budget feasibility as well as timing of the proposed actions and, last but not least, awareness of major segments inside society. Also the Ministry of Defense will be a key player in this process, not only regarding the provision of financial resources, but also the essential coordination and integration with other military services and with other public and private agencies. This effort, PROFORÇA, is the compass for the arduous and challenging task towards transforming the Institution.
Figure 1 - Critical Factors and Transformation Process
2. ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE INFORMATION AGE

a. Evolution of armed conflicts

Objectively, one could summarize the large conventional military strategy in three (three) phases:

1) the first, which occurred since the dawn of civilization until the Napoleonic wars, in the early nineteenth century, characterized by the annihilation of the enemy army, when the opposing forces faced each other into a battlefield, and a single battle often could decide an entire campaign;

2) the second began with the Industrial Revolution, which brought the capacity of nation states developed, mobilize, equip and train large battle formations. During the U.S. Civil War (1861 - 1865), it was realized that, despite a series of defeats before the Confederate Army, the North's industrial base allowed him to mobilize more troops to support continuously the war effort. In a very close timeline (1864 - 1870), in South America, the final victory of the Allies upon the War of the Triple Alliance showed that the ability to stay in combat - or to endure in action - among other reasons, was decisive for the outcome of the Conflict. This strategy, typical of industrial civilizations of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, was called exhaustion. In this scenario, it became imperative to destroy the sources that supported the war effort, and civilian casualties became greater in figures.

3) finally, the third strategy, paralysis, advocates the use of military power so intense, in a short time and in broad spectrum, in order to immobilize the opponent. It appeared clearly in the outbreak of the Six Day War (1967), when Israel attacked its Arab neighbors so almost simultaneously on all fronts. The increasing technological advances, observed in the campaigns of IRAQ (1991 and 2003) and Kosovo (1999), multiplied its vectors, expanding the possibilities of this strategy. Paralysis, born in the Industrial Age, will remain employed in the foreseeable future, particularly when applied against constituted countries. However, the growing importance of non-state actors in armed conflicts brings to the armies in the future the need to be able to fight in asymmetrical warfare.

b. Armies in the Information Age

The new reality of conflicts gave rise to the search for a new military design, in order to adapt them to the new societies, no more of the Industrial Age, but the, so called, the Information Age. Regarding ground forces, some common trends can be noted.

1) To have a battlefield ambience characterized by an extensive network of sensors and data transmission, allowing commanders of various levels and ranks to establish the so-called "situational awareness" of operations, as well as to grab the initiative of ongoing actions;

2) Development of plans for a new individual fighter (future soldier programs), based on the concepts of protection & survival, welfare, communications with digitized data, fitting with the flexibility of employment and continuing operations (day-night);

3) To obtain information superiority in combat, integrating the activities of Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, Deception, Security Operations, Cyber Defense, Civil and Media Affairs;
4) Activation, from Brigade level staffs and above, of Public Information and Civil-Military Cooperation cells, to deal with the media, local population and with international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the area of operations;

5) Combat structures organized, at Brigade level, into 03 basic configurations: mechanized, armored and light, besides increasingly use of special operations;

6) Downsizing of military combat and support structures, adapting them to the budget constraints, without loss of rapid response capabilities, strategic mobility, interoperability between military services and among agencies, flexibility and elasticity;

7) Capacity to operate inside the cyberspace, seeking freedom of action and use of safety nets, and take actions to protect computer networks and communications;

8) Intensive use of smart ammunitions;

9) Intensive use of unmanned devices;

10) Deployment, on a wider scale, of special operations, and

11) Training based on capabilities and skills.

This latter trend is a paradigm shift when training land forces. Building new capabilities enables the institution to provide tools to respond effectively to the challenges that the future will present somewhat diffuse. It has some advantages:

1) flexibility to the organization of their (land forces) assets;

2) reduced need to transfer military units, in a country as large as Brazil;

3) better use of the Army Reserves;

4) provides parameters for budget planning;

5) easy to retrofit the Force;

6) provides performance indicators for training;

7) concentrates structures and training centers;

8) reduces the need of facilities;

9) enhances mobility, versatility and modularity;

10) favors the strategy of deterrence; and

11) ensures greater responsiveness and pro activity.

c. Trends in Future Armed Conflicts

1) Inside an environment of high uncertainty, it is essential to have a continued threat assessment. It is critical for success the ability of an Armed Force to anticipate, learn and adapt to the hybrid nature of conflicts by combining conventional, irregular and asymmetric threats, to the detriment of traditional paradigms.

2) Due to the previous statement, it becomes even more important to have resilience, defined as the collective and individual capacity - in the face of uncertainty - to absorb the impact of adversity and respond effectively; to recover and adapt quickly; and persevere without losing focus on fulfilling their missions.
3) On the world stage, increasing factors of instability are to be expected, as competition for scarce natural resources, uncontrolled migration and environmental degradation. These factors are associated with "new threats" such as terrorism, drug traffic organized crime, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and environmental themes, which affect, or will continue to affect countries’ security & defense, in the near future. Issues relating to ethnic groups, social movements driven by revolutionary or ideological ideals (that go beyond the territory of a country), can be sources of tension among States. The frame of future wars will be related to these risk factors. PROFORÇA included the acquisition of skills, related to so-called "new threats". However, priority was given to high deterrent capability of the Land Forces.

4) Public opinion (population) is to be part into the center of gravity of a conflict. The vision spread by the media will remain crucial to shape public opinion and to the success of operations. The battle for communication (media, psychological operations, etc.), will be paramount to the success of campaigns.

5) Conflicts shall have fewer casualties, vital characteristic of the current operations, mainly due to the negative impact that such losses cause within the societies. Therefore, to safeguard human resources with a protection system, consisting of: air defense, chemical/radiological/biological and nuclear defense, field medical assistance, environmental issues, civil affairs, engineering and military police, among others - should have even greater attention in future conflicts, which makes this system a requirement of a strategic nature.

6) Studies indicate that conflicts in the future will continue to require high degree of autonomy with centralized planning and decentralized execution, and will consider new factors, such as the influence of social networks in the freedom of action of armies.

7) In addition to the resilience requirements, it is understood that success in future conflicts will require a force with:

   a) Leadership at all levels;
   b) Awareness of a wide spectrum of actors set in the conflict and also neutral forces;
   c) Command and control (C²);
   d) Flexibility, ie: the ability to monitor strategic areas, related to mobility, to ensure the rapid deployment of the Force;
   e) Elasticity, understood as the ability to resize the Force as needed, mobilizing human, material and financial resources, offering reliable reserves; and
   f) Selective lethality characterized by precision weaponry and reduced collateral damages.

8) It becomes increasingly and broader the universe of potential adversaries, "state" or "non-state", because their access to a wide variety of assets, including the cyberspace, is greatly facilitated, which enhances the possibility of attacks being made by nations or groups, including terrorists.

9) The strategic environment will be disputed (the struggle for freedom of action); congested (Urban areas, the civilian population), diffuse (difficulty in identifying the combatants - collateral damage); interconnected (networks) and with restricted action (rules – to us – that limit actions).
10) Reduction of technological advantage in the operating environment and the characteristics of urban operations, which tend to require substantial troops on the ground for its sustainment.

11) The simultaneous action of agents and non-military agencies will be the tonic, such as: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Humanitarian Organizations of Assistance (HOA) and supranational agencies (the U.N. or regional organizations).

12) Despite all trends listed, the land component of the military, despite the technological evolution of the combat, will continue to be the key factor of long-term campaigns, by the following reasons:
   a) It is intended to **engage and defeat** the enemy’s ground forces;
   b) **Conquers and keep** areas of interest;
   c) Provides significant and **direct influence on the population**;
   d) Creates conditions for the entrance / **operation of other agencies** in the conflicted area;
   e) Represents a strong political **commitment** to operations (casualties) and
   f) **Contributes significantly** to the **deterrent effect** of the joint force.

13) The fundamental **nature** of armed conflict tends, however, to remain as an act of **violent confrontation**.

   The trends hereby presented highlight the complexity of the battlefield into the future. There is no indication that the lethality of an army should be ignored, but should be more selective and effective instead. Therefore, an army trained and ready to act on broad-spectrum operations is necessary to produce the **deterrent effect required to meet future national interests**. It is also necessary to foresee the future of the Brazilian Army and the **desired profile** of its most valuable asset - **Human** - to implement the necessary changes.
3. AN EVERLASTING ARMY, A NEW FORCE

a. Introspective Vision

The soldiers of Brazilian Army are aware that the institution remains an everlasting Army, with its unchanging core values, which contributed decisively in the most critical moments of national History, helping to lay the foundations that support Brazilian Society. They also know that these values must be passed to the future "olive generations." However, there is a strong feeling, in the Force, about the need to implement actions that will restore degraded capacities and will add new capabilities, essential to the Army of the future.

In short: "AN EVERLASTING ARMY, A NEW FORCE."

b. The Future Profile of Army’s Professionals

The Military preserves the Army Culture (values and rich traditions) as a factor of cohesion and identification with his past, his present and his future, despite the Transformation Process in development. However, the ideas and concepts presented indicate that the Army should have characteristics that will give the support for Brazil’s role in areas of strategic interest. Thus, forces remain responsive, endowed with strategic mobility, flexibility, elasticity and lethality, essential to provide deterrence and extra-regional deployment capability. To this end, it is imperative that Logistics provides adequate support and sustainability of operations, and evolve rapidly, from the situation of peace to the armed conflict.

The Brazilian Army understands that its most valuable asset is its human resources, adequate effective, capable and motivated. They are what we call "the strength of our Force" and still a larger factor of imbalance in any conflict. Therefore there is a growing care of Army’s Human Dimension, including the support for military families. To meet the design described for the Army in the future, it is essential to the monitoring of future scenarios and trends, that will impact the evolution of doctrine, training, and use of the Force. Regarding the human capital, the current perception is that the professional of the future must be qualified / trained to:

1) Transmit the traditions and values of the Brazilian Army (Military Culture) and keep them;
2) Lead, at all levels;
3) Fight both conventional and asymmetric operations (broad spectrum);
4) Conduct military operations other than war;
5) Participate in joint, multinational and interagency operations;
6) Attend an Expeditionary Force;
7) Integrate combat information, inside an Operational Information System (Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, Deception etc.);
8) Communicate in English and/or Spanish, especially concerned to their instrumental aspect;
9) Operate into the cyberspace;
10) Develop critical thinking;
11) Develop scientific research to cooperate with the development of Army Doctrine;
12) Identify the implications of environmental laws for the Brazilian Army;
13) Know basics of international relations;
14) Have strong knowledge of Military History and Professional Ethics;
15) Use principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) / Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC);
16) Negotiate and to manage crisis;
17) Develop the attributes of adaptability, initiative, cooperation, hardiness, persistence, resilience and flexibility;
18) Operate hi-tech military equipment;
19) Know basics about Information Technology Systems;
20) Operate and interact with Autonomous Systems (unmanned vehicles, robots etc.);
21) Work in collaborative environments (networks); and
22) Use management tools.

The attributes presented are the result of a 20 year preview. The breakneck development of the national and international realities will require a continuous reassessment of the military professional.
3. BACKGROUND

a. The approval of the National Defense Strategy (NDS/2008) stimulated new approaches and demands on topics related to **defense**. That statute lists principles, structural axes and guidelines, among other ideas, which guide the planning of the Brazilian Armed Services to develop new concepts of architecture and equipment. For the Brazilian Army, the resulting plan was called **STRONG ARM Strategy (SAS/2009)**, consisting of two Plans - **Deployment** and **Equipment** - turned into four Programs – **Protected Amazon & Motherland Sentry (Deployment)** and **Strategic Mobility & Brazilian Fighting Soldier (Equipment)** - of which 824 projects were derived. This plan was prepared under the assumption of lack of budget constraints, a factor that presents as a significant obstacle, even in the future scenarios set.

b. In addition to the aforementioned obstacle, the diagnosis of the Brazilian Army, carried out during 2009/2010 revealed the existence of critical points that restricted the desired changes in SAS/2009. It was concluded also that the projects would provide SAS/2009 upgrades, but there would be no institutional transformation, necessary to develop new capabilities that will meet new missions or will perform new functions in combat. The **modernization** focuses on the physical structures of the Force, bringing the past to the present, since the **transformation** is a radical change that alters the concepts - such as teaching, management, the desired profile of the professionals, etc. - Designing the Force to the future, and accelerates the evolutionary process of the Brazilian Army. **PROFORÇA is the tipping point** that will provide speed and boost the Force to achieve, with opportunity, the Information Age and beyond.

![Figure 2 - Paths for the Brazilian Army to evolve towards the Information Age](image-url)
c. In 2010, studies began to implement a Transformation Process. For this, nine transformation vectors (TV) were selected, which received the mission to plan over specific areas, corresponding to critical points, or "bottlenecks".

d. At the beginning of TV work, it was felt the need for a planning adviser which signaled the goals and guidelines to vectors. Thus, the PROFORÇA was designed to obtain synergy and convergence of efforts of the TV. PROFORÇA work team started at the second half of 2010.

e. Also due to NDS/2008, the Army began upgrading the Army Planning System (SIPLEx), from edition 2008 to 2011. **SIPLEx is the tool** that will provide the necessary framework for PROFORÇA.

f. Consistent with the purpose of PROFORÇA, it was established as the basis of the new **Strategic Concept of the Force**, whose guidelines are set out below.
4. GUIDELINES FOR THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

a. Purpose of the Land Forces

To be the military instrument (Land Forces) capable of decisively contribute for the Brazilian Nation to overcome a crisis or to win a conflict, whether by deterrence or force.

b. Basis for Strategic Design

1) Constraints

The proposal for a new strategic concept often assumes a level of acceptable risk (difference between the required capabilities of Military Land Power to fulfill all its missions and its real possibilities) and seeks to align with the aforementioned vision for the future. The actual situation places Brazilian Army far away from that army conceived by SAS/2009, due to an unmet demand for budgetary resources.

   a) The first condition is the immediate rationalization of the Brazilian Army, in order to optimize the use of these resources for investments and funding of the Force.

   b) The second condition is brief time length of modern conflicts between states, which requires the ability to prompt response and immediate replenishment, with minimal reliance on mobilization for the initial (and perhaps only) phase of these conflicts. However, asymmetric conflicts or against "new threats" tend to be long lasting, which requires rotation of personnel and equipment. The Force, therefore, must have a mobilization system with adequate elasticity.

   c) The third condition is to support Country’s foreign policy, to meet commitments under the aegis of international organizations or to safeguard interests of Brazilians abroad, from the prospect of increasing projection of BRAZIL into the World and possible reactions to this new status. Actions related to co-operation with countries around the strategic surroundings (South America, Caribbean and West Africa) should be intensified.

   d) The fourth condition is related to the urgent need to monitor, control and operate at the extensive land borders, based upon SISFRON. This would reduce problems arising from border areas and will strengthen interoperability, interagency operations and regional co-operation.

   e) The fifth condition meets the requirements of NDS/2008, regarding to:

      (1) keep the Presence Strategy2, albeit selectively;

      (2) regional co-operation;

      (3) mobility, which will be increased with the implementation of the GUARANI project;

      (4) security of critical / strategic infrastructure (energy generation, transportation, etc.);

      (5) develop the ability to operate in cyberspace, a task coordinated by the Brazilian Army, under the Ministry of Defense, with the central body being the Center for Cyber Defense; and

      (6) keep the Compulsory Military Service (yet improved).

   f) The sixth condition is intended to meet the constitutional mission of “uphold law and order” (ULO) and the subsidiaries assignments3.

2 For centuries, the Army has been a key factor of development in far areas inside Brazil; although minimized, it is still important. (unclassified)
g) In summary, we conclude that the land component of Military Power has to be a decisive factor for national military deterrence. It shall prevent concentration of hostile forces along the land border and helps to deter the presence of hostile forces in territorial waters and airspace. The gradual increase in the deterrent level is required, evolving from regional to extra-regional dimension.

2) Design

a) The basic design relates to the need for the Army Forces to be permanently organized, trained and deployed to grab the initiative and the achievement of a decisive advantage, for the subsequent political negotiation on favorable terms.

b) The operational units (Land Forces) will be framed in three (03) groups: Strategic Deployment Forces (SDF), Border Forces (BFor) and General Purpose Forces (GPF).

c) SDF are made up of troops with tactical or strategic mobility and high readiness, able to operate anywhere in the country and areas of interest. To support the deterrence, must have also the means of engagement, both defensive and offensive, with long range.

d) The BFor troops are aimed for initial employment at the land border, with the primary mission to maintain the inviolability of national territory. They are linked to SISFRON. It is understood that inviolability would be the non-occurrence of military operations in the country, by hostile forces. They will be capable of monitoring, control and prompt action.

e) The GPF meet: the replenishment and / or strengthening, primarily of the BFor, the selective presence of Army units along the Country, the bulk of Compulsory Military Service, and the training of reserves. These troops also form the General Reserve of the Army.

f) If a crisis or armed conflict arises, Forces will be deployed to obtain a favorable strategic imbalance, initially by the SDF, partially or as a whole.

g) In Defense of the Motherland, the Land Forces will be deployed, driven by the Ministry of Defense, to carry joint operations with the other military services, as follows:

(1) initially, the use of BFor to preserve the territorial inviolability; they (BFor) can anticipate an attack and operate outside the national territory, while it is performed the gathering of the SDF, to enhance deterrence; and

(2) if necessary, neutralize the threat.

h) Still in Homeland Defense, if confronted decisively with the violation of national territory by military power unquestionably superior, also act through operations based on resistance, for a period of time which would conduct the aggressor to a deadlock, by extended wear and the vagueness of the conflict, allowing subsequent negotiations, in order to maintain the status quo ante bellum.

3 The three Services have, by Law, duties regarding internal security and also to work alongside with the government for the Country’s development.

(unclassified)
i) When deployed to **ULO** and **subsidiary missions**, the Army Commander, received the order from the President, through the Ministry of Defense, will determine the Land Operations Command (COTER) to issue guidelines for the Military Area Command (seven, presently), which is tasked to conduct operations. National presence, in this case, facilitates the availability of troops throughout the Country.

j) **In support of the foreign policy**, to meet commitments under the aegis of international organizations or to protect Brazilian interests abroad, shall be organized an **Expeditionary Force**, whether for **combat or peace operations**, comprising elements from SDF, initially. Such a structure should be able to act promptly and in full spectrum operations, like a Multinational Force. In the specific case of peacekeeping operations, taking advantage of the expertise accumulated in recent missions and consolidated by COTER / Joint Center for Peacekeeping Operations in Brazil (CCOPAB), other troops, not part of the SDF, could be deployed.

k) The **Brigade** remains the basic module of deployment, as a "**Great Unity formed by a balanced set of elements of combat and C^2**; accordingly to their level of readiness and missions, will be reinforced by combat and logistic support elements, that will give the ability to operate independently and to endure in action." Some brigades will retain the current doctrinal framework, while other structures may receive from higher echelons the assets/units necessary for their training and deployment.

l) The strategic guidelines for the present design include the strategies of **deterrence, presence, offensive, power projection** and **resistance**.

c. These guidelines point to the construction of **new capabilities**, focused on the modern governance of the Institution and the use of Land Forces.
6. NEW CAPABILITIES

Based on the missions and tasks contained in the SIPLEx, the self evaluation and prospective vision, by scenarios and trends, it came to the new skills required for the Force. The following figure presents these new capabilities, which were described, on the original document, by its description and the strategies to achieve them.